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Philip Arestis, University of Cambridge and University of the Basque Country
Malcolm Sawyer University of Leeds
Abstract: The ‘great recession’ has highlighted a range of problems with the ‘euro project’,
but these problems and difficulties are related to some fundamental weaknesses of the euro.
The convergence criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty focused on nominal rather than
real variables, failed to relate to issues such as current account positions. There are well-
known difficulties of macroeconomic policies under the Stability and Growth Pact including
its deflationary nature and the ‘one size fits all problem’ of imposing common deficit
requirements on all countries. Problems with the EMU monetary policy are also discussed
before the economic performance of the euro area countries is briefly reviewed with attention
paid to the differential inflation rates. Also accounted for are the changes in competitiveness
as well as the current account deficits, and their implications for the future of economic
performance within the euro area, and the euro itself. The nature of the reforms and their
impact on the operations of the euro area are examined. The political limits (including those
arising from the nature of the Treaty of Lisbon) and the ideological constraints (associated
with the neo-liberal agenda) on serious reforms are discussed from which the general
conclusion is that the needed reforms are extremely urgent, but unfortunately they will not be
carried through. This discussion also includes consideration of the possible role for a
substantial EMU-level fiscal policy and some other aspects of political integration. It is
concluded that the deep-seated problems are unlikely to be resolved, casting a dark shadow
over the future of the euro.
Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union, Euro, Stability and Growth Pact, Fiscal Policy,
Monetary Policy, Competitiveness, Current Account Imbalances, Political Integration
JEL Classification: O52, E60
21. Introduction
The euro has been operating since 2002 (and since 1999 if the period as a virtual currency is
included). Its introduction was technically accepted and the switch over was perceived to
have met few problems, though there were some perceptions that prices rose when the euro
was introduced (a perception which does not show up in the statistics). Although there have
been occasional rumblings against it, there has not until very recently been any concerted
effort for a country to withdraw from the euro and revert to a national currency, but the
financial and budgetary crises in a number of countries have brought withdrawl of some from
the euro as a seriously considered option.
The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the single currency (euro) in 1999 alongside
with the foundation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The euro replaced the
national currencies for all transactions at the beginning of 2002 for twelve countries, namely
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. This meant that three countries, namely Denmark, Sweden
and the United Kingdom, of the then 15 members of the European Union did not join the
euro. The European Union (hereafter EU) expanded in May 2004 with ten new member
countries, eight from Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC) (Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia) plus Cyprus and Malta.
There was a subsequent expansion with Bulgaria and Romania joining in January 2007. Of
the new (2004) member states, five have since adopted the euro, namely Slovenia (2007),
Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009) and Estonia (2011).
The economic performance of the euro area countries during the decade or more of the euro’s
existence, as briefly surveyed below has been rather lack lustre even before the financial
crisis struck – economic growth has been sluggish, inflation has remained low though often
breaking the 2 per cent target, and unemployment has remained high, as indicated below.
There have been continuing disparities in economic performance in terms of unemployment
and standards of living, which are highly significant as measures of economic well being, and
the framework of the euro area has little to address them. But for the future operation and
indeed survival of the euro area the differences in inflation, in budget deficits and in current
account positions may be much more significant as further discussed below.
The ‘great recession’ that emerged in August 2007 has highlighted severely many of the
economic problems to which we have just alluded for the euro area countries. The sharp
increases in budget deficits as the economies slowed and tax revenues plummeted meant that
the limits of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were breached. Fortunately, the immediate
response was generally to accept those breaches but it was not long before the calls for
concerted action in terms of reduction of budget deficits and fiscal consolidation started. The
danger now is that attempts by countries to cut their budget deficits will have cumulative
negative effects on employment and growth and have little actual effect on budget deficits.
The ‘Greek tragedy’ and the crises in Ireland and Portugal, though, have exposed very
obviously a number of these problems, which have also led to the question of the euro’s
survival. A particular problem related to the ‘Greek tragedy’, which is even more closely
related to the euro, is the attitude of the European Central Bank (ECB) that refuses to
consider a restructuring of Greek debt; and it is thought to be the only party involved that
rejects outrightly the idea of Greek debt restructuring. Such attitude could easily produce
serious problems for the euro and it could result in its collapse.1 The ECB insists that Greece
is given more bailout loans for more austerity measures in Greece. In fact, the ECB is hostile
to any form of debt restructuring, threatening to deny Greek banks access to ECB refinance
1 The split referred to in the text relates to a sharp division of views between the ECB and the EMU political
leaders. This dispute is over how to solve the Greek sovereign debt crisis, which is a very serious one and as
such it threatens the euro existence seriously.
3operations; such a threat if implemented would clearly force Greece out of the euro area.2
Greece cannot pursue austerity measures continuously, especially so in view of the worsening
economic situation in the country. The options for sorting out the sovereign debt are seriously
constrained. Withdrawal from the euro area could thereby become inevitable. The
consequences for such withdrawal for the euro could be serious.
We address these issues in this contribution where we first visit, in section 2, the convergence
Maastricht criteria, which were built into the euro project. This is undertaken to illustrate the
nature of the ‘euro project’ and also to indicate how some problems (such as current account
deficits in many Mediterranean countries) were left unaddressed at the start of the project and
have now come to undermine the edifice of the EMU. Section 3 briefly visits the issues of the
EMU fiscal and monetary policies. This latter section highlights some of the policy faults,
which lie at the heart of the euro. Section 4 highlights key features of the economic
performance of the EMU members since the formation of the euro by concentrating on the
twelve initial members of the union. Section 5 deals with adjustment processes and optimal
currency area considerations before section 6 turns to the question of whether the euro can be
saved, where it is argued that the constraints of the Treaty of Lisbon and the neo-liberal
framework, within which most of the countries of the EU operate, are likely to preclude
relevant policy changes initiated let alone implemented. This is likely to consign many
countries with a choice between remaining members of the euro and economic prosperity.
We also review a number of policy considerations, sections 7-10, leading to suggestions for
major policy changes, which could enable the euro to function effectively. The latter
possibility is discussed further in section 11, before concluding comments are provided in
section 12.
2. The Convergence Criteria
The Maastricht Treaty laid down criteria that should be met by those seeking to join the euro,
and indeed all the countries that met the criteria were obliged to join, though Denmark and
the UK secured opt-outs from that obligation.3 The ‘convergence criteria’ were set in nominal
terms (relating to inflation and interest rates for example) with no mention of real
convergence (in terms of, for example, output per head or unemployment rates) or even of the
convergence of business cycles across countries. These ‘convergence criteria’ are now largely
of historic interest, though they are still relevant for those EU countries, which may seek to
join the euro in the future. But the ‘convergence criteria’ do provide some insights into the
nature of the ‘euro project’ and to which elements were deemed significant and important;
and by omission those which were not so deemed.
The criteria include a budget deficit and a government debt criterion designed to establish
‘fiscal responsibility’ in the eyes of the financial markets and had no underlying rationale.
The independence of the national central banks on an operational and political level was also
on the list of these criteria. In terms of countries meeting the criteria, it must be said that with
2 The situation in Greece since mid-May 2010, when the Greek rescue was launched, is even worse. The
austerity measures introduced at the time have resulted so far and according to the 2010 figures to a debt to GDP
ratio of 142.80 per cent and to a deficit to GDP ratio of 10.5 per cent. Both figures are above the equivalent ratio
of 2009, when the ‘Greek Tragedy’ emerged. In the case of debt to GDP it is clearly higher (it was 127 per cent
in 2009). In the case of the deficit to GDP although it was admittedly 15.4 per cent in 2009, it was nonetheless
targeted to achieve an 8.1 per cent by 2010. Figures are available on:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Greece).
3 The convergence criteria applied to each country for membership of the EMU under the Maastricht Treaty are:
(1) average exchange rate not to deviate by more than 2.25 per cent from its central rate for the two years prior
to membership; (2) inflation rate should not exceed the average rate of inflation of the three community nations
with the lowest inflation rate by 1.5 per cent; (3) long-term interest rates not to exceed the average interest rate
by 2 per cent of the three countries with the lowest inflation rate; (4) government budget deficit not to exceed 3
per cent of its GDP; (5) overall government debt not to exceed 60 per cent of its GDP.
4the exception of the inflation rate and the interest rate, they were not met as comfortably as it
might have appeared initially. In fact a great deal of ‘fudging’ took place (see, for example,
Arestis et al., 2001).
The adoption of a national ‘independent’ Central Bank, as a forerunner for inclusion into the
European System of Central Banks with the European Central Bank at its apex, signalled the
adoption of a neo-liberal agenda (Arestis and Sawyer, 2006a, 2006c; Lucarelli, 2004). The
requirements for budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP and public debt below 60 percent
were signals of the fixation with the budgetary position, though in practice the 60 percent
limit was not attained by many who joined and the 3 percent limit reached in a number of
cases only through the use of creative accounting (Arestis et al., 2001). The requirements for
the interest rate and inflation rate in a country to be close to the average achieved in the three
countries with lowest inflation had an inherent rationale. It was that after the formation of
EMU, a single interest rate regime would apply and a common inflationary experience would
be required for the successful continuation of the euro. A stability of a country’s exchange
rate relative to the other countries of the EMU had a similar intuitive appeal since the
exchange rates of the EMU countries were about to be locked together.
3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the EMU4
The key features of the SGP are as follows: the first is the idea that national governments
should aim for their budgets to be in balance or small surplus over the course of a business
cycle and not to exceed 3 per cent of GDP in any given year; and the second is that the ECB
acting independently use interest rate policy to achieve price stability. National fiscal policy is
subject to the requirements of the SGP (with no fiscal policy at the level of the EU with a
balanced budget requirement and EU expenditure set at somewhat over 1 per cent of EU GDP).
The official rationale for the SGP is twofold. The first is that a medium-term balanced budget
rule secures the scope for automatic stabilisers without breaching the limits set by the SGP.
Second, since a balanced budget explicitly sets the debt ratio on a declining trend, it reduces
the interest burden and improves the overall position of the government budget. Underlying
the approach to SGP, though, is the notion of sound public finances. The European
Commission (2000) is emphatic on this issue: “Achieving and sustaining sound positions in
public finances is essential to raise output and employment in Europe. Low public debt and
deficits help maintain low interest rates, facilitate the task of monetary authorities in keeping
inflation under control and create a stable environment which fosters investment and growth
... The Maastricht Treaty clearly recognises the need for enhanced fiscal discipline in EMU to
avoid overburdening the single monetary authority and prevent fiscal crises, which would
have negative consequences for other countries. Moreover, the loss of exchange rate
instrument implies the need to create room for fiscal policy to tackle adverse economic
shocks and smooth the business cycle. The stability and growth pact is the concrete
manifestation of the shared need for fiscal discipline” (p. 1).
Tables 1 and 2 near here
The figures in Table 1 indicate that over the period 2002-2007 the budget deficit for the euro
area as a whole averaged under 2 per cent of GDP. Although this period of six years may not
be a complete business cycle the figure is nevertheless suggestive that the overall intention of
budgets in balance or small surplus was not attained. The same Table also indicates that four
of the initial 12 euro area members breached the 3 per cent of GDP upper limit on budget
deficits. It is clear from this table that there are three groups of countries: one group includes
those countries that had deficits above the 3 per cent SGP ceiling in their budget throughout
4 For extensive discussion on fiscal and monetary policy in the EMU see Arestis and Sawyer (2006a, 2006b,
2006c).
5the period; another group which, although had deficit it was a small percentage of GDP; and
a third group that had surplus over the period. The euro area as a whole, though, had a deficit
throughout the period. The imposition of an upper limit of 3 per cent of GDP on the size of
the budget deficit and the declaration of the aim of a balanced budget over the cycle
represented a significant tightening of the fiscal position as compared with the 3 per cent of
GDP target for the budget deficit in the Maastricht Treaty convergence conditions. In those
conditions, the 3 per cent was to be achieved at a particular point in time: under the SGP the 3
per cent limit is to be exceeded only under extreme conditions. The figures for 2008 begin to
worsen and the ones for 2009 and 2010 clearly well exceed the 3 percent limit, with the
exception of Luxembourg.
The general requirement that the budget be in balance or small surplus over the course of the
business cycle is more deflationary than it sounds when allowance is made for inflation and
the deficit is calculated in real terms. For example, with a 60 per cent debt to GDP ratio,
inflation of 2 per cent per annum would mean that the real value of the outstanding debt
declined by 1.2 per cent of GDP, and hence in real terms a balanced budget in nominal terms
equates to a 1.2 per cent of GDP surplus. There is also an essential contradiction between the
60 per cent debt to GDP ratio and a balanced budget. It can readily be shown that a persistent
overall budget deficit (that is including interest payments on government debt) of d (relative
to GDP) would lead to public debt stabilising at b = d/g where g is the nominal rate of
growth.5 Taking as an example g = 0.05 (a 5 per cent growth rate built up from say 2 ½ per
cent real growth and 2 ½ per cent inflation) then the debt ratio would be 20 times the deficit
ratio. In that example a 60 per cent debt ratio would be consistent with a persistent 3 per cent
deficit ratio – indeed that precise calculation was given as a justification for the 3 per cent
deficit, 60 per cent debt target in the convergence criteria.
The ECB and the national central banks of the EMU countries comprise the European System
of Central Banks (ESCB), and the ECB was endowed with the responsibility for the single
monetary policy “that is independent from political influence” (ECB, 2004, p. 12). The ESCB
Treaty, Article 105 (1), states that “the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain
price stability” and that “without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall
support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the
achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2”. Table 2 shows
that inflation in the euro area has generally been above the 2 per cent level, with the
exception of 2009, albeit by a relatively small amount, and averaged 2.6 per cent over the
period 2002-2008. Only Finland and Germany managed an inflation rate of less than 2 per
cent during that period; the 12 euro area average of inflation rose to 2.9 percent in 2010.
Furthermore, it is the differences in inflation between countries, which have plagued the euro
area. This has meant that a country with a relatively low (high) inflation rate has a relatively
high (low) real interest rate since there is a common nominal interest rate anchor as set by the
ECB applying across the EMU. Thus, monetary policy has operated in a perverse manner
with low real rates applying where inflation is relatively high, running counter to the
presumptions of inflation targeting that high inflation is met by high real rates of interest to
dampen demand.
The ECB may appear to have been rigid, especially when compared with the Bank of
England and the US Federal Reserve System (Fed). If we take the period of the ‘great
recession’ since August 2007, the US Fed has aggressively reduced interest rates over the
period; the Bank of England has behaved in a similar, if in a less aggressive, manner. The
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6ECB has not behaved in such a fashion. There has been great reluctance to reduce interest
rates even in obvious circumstances. It is true that the ECB adopted a ‘wait and see’
approach, at the beginning of the ‘great recession’, before following the other two central
Banks. Focusing more closely in terms of the period near but after August 2007, the reaction
of the ECB was relatively modest. Initially, the upsurge in inflation convinced the ECB to
keep interest rates relatively high for a long time, and this was especially so in July 2008
when there were already signs of economic slowdown. Subsequently, the ECB was slow to
push interest rates down. In the event when the banking crisis began to infect the real
economy very seriously, interest rates were cut by a total of 225 basis points up to January
2009 and eventually to 1 per cent in May 2009. The reduction in interest rates by 225 basis
points was done in four steps within a historically short period of time. But it was not as bold
as that of other central banks. In any case, it has been raised to 1.25 percent in April 2011.
Nor has the ECB pursued ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE) as, for example, the Federal Reserve
System or the Bank of England. Although it has resisted QE, the ECB has, nonetheless,
pioneered other types of policies. Under the phrase ‘Enhanced Credit Support’ (ECS), the
ECB’s policy has been one of providing unlimited liquidity to banks at its rate and under
covered bonds. Covered bonds are securities that usually attract top triple-A ratings. They are
also a major source of mortgage finance in the EMU. They are, thus, safe securities since in
the event of default investors have redress to the issuer’s balance sheet; they are, thus, of low
risk of default. The ECB broadened the collateral it accepts in June 2009, when under the
ECS scheme it extended the maturity of the collateral to up to 12 months. The reason for such
a policy as opposed to QE is that in addition to the low risk, in Europe conventional loans
comprise the bulk of credit, so that using covered bonds, which are issued by banks, could
potentially affect bank lending. The banking system plays a much bigger role in providing
finance in Europe than in, for example, the US and the UK.
The Treaty of Lisbon, and its forerunners, bars the monetisation of member governments’
deficits and debts. It is permissive but not mandatory for the ECB to act as a lender of last
resort. The general practice is for a central bank to act as a ‘lender of last resort’ and to
operate such that ‘sound financial paper’ is discounted at the pre-announced discount rate and
exchanged for base money. Banks can then obtain reserves from the central bank in exchange
for ‘sound financial paper’. Such paper would include (but not always limited to) government
debt. The ECB announced soon after the bailout of Greece in May 2010 that it would only
accept sound financial assets.
4. Economic Performance in the Euro Area
The economic performance of the euro area countries are briefly reviewed in terms of
growth, unemployment, inflation and current account, as well as the extent to which the
requirements of the SGP were met. Particular attention is paid to the differential inflation
rates, the changes in competitiveness and the current account deficits, and their implications
for the future of economic performance within the euro area and the euro itself. The patterns
of current account deficits and surpluses are linked with unemployment, lack of
competitiveness and budget deficit issues.
Tables 3 and 4 near here
Tables 3 and 4 provide summary data relevant for economic performance of the euro area.
The data in both tables relate to the decade since the euro was launched as a ‘real currency’.
Three main points emerge:
(i) there were large and continuing current account imbalances between the EMU
countries; especially and persistently so the large external surpluses and deficits coexisted
in the core and peripheral countries respectively. The same situation continues over the
7years 2002-2007 and subsequently in 2008, 2009 and 2010 (see Table 3). Those
imbalances were not the subject of surveillance within the framework of the SGP;6
(ii) there were substantial differences between countries in terms of changes in unit labour
costs (see table 3). The implied changes in competitiveness, and economic policies; in
terms of the loss of competitiveness it is estimated to be between 25% and 30% for
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain since the creation of the EMU in January 1999. It is
clear that economic convergence, crucially in terms of costs in this instance, has not
materialised;7
(iii) the growth rates for the periods 1991-2000, 2000-2007 and for 2008-2010 vary
significantly amongst the 12 euro area countries; the unemployment rate also differs
significantly amongst countries, but worsens by 2010 in a number of countries, especially
so in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
The growth performance of the euro area during the 2000s was somewhat below the growth
of the 1990s (as indicated in Table 4) although the global economy was growing rather faster.
The growth figures in that time run through to 2007, whereas, of course, if 2008, 2009 and
2011 were included the comparison between the 2000s and 1990s would be even less
favourable to the euro project. Unemployment did fall during the mid-part of the 2000s but
the ‘great recession’ wiped out those gains. The figures in Table 3 indicate that current
account positions vary substantially between countries with most Southern European
countries having substantial deficits whereas Northern European countries (with the
exception of France) have surpluses.
The protracted weak performance of the euro area can be attributed to two main factors: the
incomplete integration of the financial system and to the absence of a central authority to deal
with crises (IMF, 2011). The latter goes on to warn that the EMU is vulnerable to another
systemic banking crisis in view of the sovereign debt problem in some ‘distressed peripheral’
euro area member countries.8 Such a situation could easily produce contagion to the ‘core
euro area’ and to the EU, but more so in ‘emerging Europe’. This is so, the IMF (op. cit.)
suggests, in view of banks in the core periphery countries being significantly exposed to the
euro area periphery. Under such circumstances, restructuring the sovereign debt of the
‘distressed peripheral’ countries could produce a systemic risk to the entire EMU, thereby
risking a ‘second credit crunch’ (IMF, op. cit.). We elaborate further on the aspects
mentioned above
The data in Tables 2 and 3 indicate something of the scale by which relative prices and
relative unit labour costs have changed, when the nominal exchange rates of the national
currencies of the original EMU member states were locked together. One interpretation of
those changes could be that they represent the adjustment of real exchange rates between
EMU member countries in the face of a combination of inappropriately set of nominal
6 It should be noted that a current account deficit can interact with a budget deficit in the following sense. A
current account deficit and a budget deficit will be related for a given net savings position. Other things being
equal (that is net savings) then a larger current account deficit would be associated with a larger budget deficit
(there is no causal link implied).
7 The percentages mentioned in the text are from the OECD Economic Outlook data (various issues).
8 According to IMF (2011) estimates, Germany’s banking sector exposure to EMU ‘distressed periphery’
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) debt is over 150 percent of their equity capital; France’s banking sector
exposure is just under 100 percent, and the rest of the EMU is about 50 percent. Interestingly enough, and
following the bailout of Greece in May 2010, the ECB exposure to the Greek state and Greek banks is 190bn
euros. Clearly, the ECB exposure to Greek debt is very high so that restructuring of this debt would produce
huge losses to it. It clearly follows that restructuring of the Greek sovereign debt would produce huge losses to
the ECB. It is for this reason that the Governor of the ECB is so much against restructuring of the Greek debt
(see, for example, Trichet, 2011a).
8exchange rates (back in 1998 for most) and ‘shocks’. But that overlooks the prevailing
current account deficits when the euro was formed and some tendency for the current account
deficits to persist and widen. A country in a fixed exchange rate system, which is, of course,
in the nature of a currency union for participating countries, in dealing with cumulative
differential inflation and current account deficits can endure domestic deflation to reduce
imports and perhaps lower domestic costs, or can devalue its currency. The latter is ruled out
by membership of the EMU: so it would appear to be the case that deflation is the only
answer.
We would draw the following conclusions from the analysis in this section. First, the record
of achieving the targets of the EMU has not been a particularly good one, with inflation target
persistently missed albeit by a small amount, and national budget deficits frequently
exceeding 3 percent of GDP. Second, the economic performance in terms of growth and
unemployment has been lack lustre. Third, there are clear problems of differential inflation,
of major changes in competitiveness and the persistence of large current account imbalances.
However, the overall conclusion then is that the economies of the euro area have not been
performing particularly well, and that the financial crisis has highlighted problems at the
heart of the euro project. This would clearly suggest that it may very well be the case that the
time has arrived for the euro to be replaced or disappear. Under the circumstances and the
problems highlighted in this section, three questions emerge: the first question is whether the
euro can still be saved. If the answer is negative, then the second question follows; could
reforming the institutional setup of the euro save it? If the answer is positive then the third
question evolves around the precise institutional changes that could potentially save the euro.
We now deal with these questions
5. Adjustment Processes and Optimal Currency Area Considerations
The ideas on the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) had rather little influence on the formation
of the ‘euro’.9 Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009), for example, argue that “The negotiators who
prepared the Maastricht Treaty did not pay attention to the OCA theory” (p. 345). The same
source also poses the question of whether Europe is an optimum currency area with the
answer that “most European countries do well on openness and diversification, two of the
three classic economic OCA criteria, and fail on the third one, labour mobility. Europe also
fails on fiscal transfers, with an unclear verdict on the remaining two political criteria” (p.
340). It is clear that EMU is not fiscally integrated. Taxpayers in one country do not pick up,
for example, any of the costs of a bank bailout of another country. It is also true that while
citizens of the EMU have the legal right to move freely in any of the member countries in
search for employment, in practice citizens are much less geographically mobile than in
countries like the US, for example. A currency union that works coincides with a nation that
has a central government and a common language; EMU has neither.
The OCA literature clearly points out that a monetary union means that the exchange rate
between constituent members cannot be changed in nominal terms. Hence, the possibility of
using changes in the exchange rate as a means of adjusting to economic ‘shocks’ or indeed to
continuing difficulties is ruled out. There can, though, be changes in the real exchange rate
through a change in the relative prices of constituent members. The OCA literature points to
the possibility of ‘price flexibility’ as a device through which a country could adjust to an
‘economic shock’. But the expectation would be that a negative shock would be compensated
by a fall in relative prices (of a country). In the euro area it appears that there have been
substantial changes in the real exchange rate of countries, as relative prices of countries have
changed reflecting differential inflation between countries. But it is rather unlikely that these
9 The OCA literature starts from Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969): for reviews see, for
example, Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009, chapter 11).
9changes in relative prices have been responses to differential shocks and that those changes
are an adjustment process. If anything the changes in relative competitiveness have worsened
rather than lessened the disparities in current account positions.
The emphasis of the OCA approach was on the ability (or otherwise) of an economy to adjust
to shocks, where the adjustments were viewed in terms of market ones of price and factor
mobility. What was little considered in the OCA, or other literature, was the consequence for
an economy, which joined the currency union with an economy, which was ‘unbalanced’. By
the latter we mean an economy (or parts thereof), which had high levels of unemployment or
one that had a large current account deficit. It is then not a matter of asking how an economy
could adjust to a shock (particularly a negative one) to restore full employment but rather
whether there is any prospect of an economy in a currency union escaping from high levels of
unemployment. In order to reach a lower level of unemployment, the demand for the output
of that economy has to be increased faster than output increases in other EMU countries. This
would generally require that the productive capacity on which workers could be employed
would also have to be created. Whilst there may be spontaneous increases in investment,
there are clear limits on the policy instruments available to promote such investment. Further,
those countries have to find additional markets for their exports without the benefits of
devaluation.
In a similar vein, an economy that enters into a currency area with a current account
imbalance lacks the ability to correct that imbalance. When that economy is able to borrow to
meet any deficit, and similarly is willing to lend when there is a surplus, the position would
be sustainable, though its debts would mount. But such an economy has to rely on borrowing
from overseas and being able to continue to do so. In our interpretation it is difficulties
arising from such borrowing which underlies many of the problems of the EMU at present.
Table 3, the column under Current Account /GDP (%), clearly demonstrates the problem to
which we have just referred. In 1999, the start year of the euro area, and also subsequently
that is data for 2002 to 2010, all this data shows that current account imbalances did prevail
and are relevant even now.
The development of a substantial EU budget, which operates to make fiscal transfers between
the relatively rich and the relatively poor countries and to act as some form of stabiliser, that
is a country experiencing a downturn receiving a greater inflow of funds, is a major policy
way in which concerns of OCA literature could be addressed. But the current account
imbalances would remain, which would seem to require mechanisms by which a country with
a current account deficit can in effect devalue in real terms, and hence a country with a
surplus revalue. This is not possible, of course, within the EMU area, while the experience of
the past decade in the EU area does not suggest that such adjustments would readily occur,
and indeed it appears that on the whole prices have adjusted in a manner opposite to that.
6. Can the Euro be Saved?
There are two key features of the euro project, which are highly relevant when thinking about
its future and whether the euro can continue in anything like its present form and be
associated with economic prosperity.
The first is an essentially neo-liberal policy framework (which has been briefly outlined
above; see, also, Arestis and Sawyer, 2006c for extensive discussion This framework has
been enshrined in law (most recently in the Treaty of Lisbon) and the neo-liberal ideology
has become deeply embedded in the European political elite and the institutions of the
European Union (and nowhere more evident than in the European Union). The second is that
the single currency has been widely viewed as the crowning pinnacle of economic integration
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in removing what could be seen as the final barrier to free trade (different currencies and the
associated costs) after the removal of non-tariff barriers under the Single European Act.
The major question here is how these two features of the euro project interact with the
operations of the euro and its problems, and more how those two features may prevent the
EMU project being changed in order for the EMU to operate to provide economic prosperity
across all its member countries. In our view the policy framework within which the EMU
operates needs to be drastically changed, but to do so runs into the major obstacles, political
and ideological, to changing the policy framework. Further, the euro has been a key element
of the drive to economic integration that any withdrawal of a country from the euro would be
a major defeat for the integration process.
The first feature was embedded in the Treaty of European Union in its various forms and now
cemented in the Treaty of Lisbon (‘The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’).
Changes to the Treaty of Lisbon require the unanimous agreement of the 27 member
countries, and since the changes required to support the euro involve policies, which could be
seen as moves towards political integration, the possibilities of making those changes is close
to zero. This indicates not only the serious weakness of the policy framework, but also that of
embedding economic policies into a constitution, which is virtually impossible to change. It
would also have to be recognized that the dominant macroeconomic institutions in the EMU,
notably the ECB and the Directorate-General of Economics and Finance, appear to be fully
signed up to the neo-liberal agenda.10
With regard to the second feature, it was recognised by some advocates of the euro, that there
were many ways in which there was insufficient economic integration to support a single
currency, but that in the presence of a single currency, integration would continue to a stage,
which did support a single currency. The conditions indicated by the Optimal Currency Area
(OCA) literature could be seen as the nature of the integration–generating movements in
relative prices and permitting factor mobility.
We have previously argued (Arestis et al., 2003, Arestis and Sawyer, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c)
that in the absence of economic integration monetary unions without political integration did
not in general have a good record of long-term survival. It is true, though, that those
monetary unions involving very small countries, for example Eastern Caribbean Currency
Union, which covers a total population of half a million, had a better survival rate. From a
state view of money, it can also be argued that a monetary union has one feature of political
integration in the sense that it is governments, which determine what is treated as legal tender
and accepted as payment of taxes. In this sense, the need for a significant EMU fiscal policy
is argued in the section that follows. The implementation of such a policy does require that
the levels of tax revenues and of public expenditure, which come within the scope of EMU
fiscal policy, and the balance between them (i.e. the budget deficit/surplus) is settled at the
EMU level. It is though also remarkable how little attention has been paid by the EMU to the
promotion of economic integration, which would promote convergence of economic
conditions between the member countries, whether with respect to unemployment, positions
in the business cycle or common inflationary and changes in competitiveness experience.
We now advance a range of macroeconomic policies and reforms which we believe would
substantially improve the economic performance and sustainability of the Economic and
10 D-G ECFIN stands for The Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, which reports to the EU
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs. The D-G ECFIN “strives to improve the economic
wellbeing of the citizens of the EU - through policies designed to promote sustainable economic growth, a high
level of employment, stable public finances and financial stability. At the present juncture, this means working
to ensure that the European economy emerges quickly and strongly from the present deep economic and
financial crisis” – this quote is available from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/index_en.htm
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Monetary Union. But we in no way underestimate the political, legal and ideological barriers,
which are raised against policy changes along the lines indicated. But it is clear to us that the
EMU cannot proceed with its current policy arrangements, and for those who strive for
economic integration in the EU must realise that changes are urgently required ‘to save the
euro’.
7. Fiscal Policy
Two basic changes in the fiscal policy arrangements in EMU are required. The first is the
need for an EMU-level fiscal policy under which the scale of the EMU budget would be
greatly increased and the EMU would be able to run budget deficits (or surpluses) to support
the level of economic activity within the EMU. The particular concern here is with the euro
area, and as such fiscal policy would be limited to EMU members. The scale of such a policy
has been variously put at 7½ percent of GDP (Commission of the European Communities,
1977), 5 percent (Huffschmid, 2005, Chapter 16), 2 to 3 percent of GDP (Currie, 1997;
Goodhart and Smith, 1993). An EMU fiscal policy would, in general, only be able to address
EMU-wide ‘shocks’. The present crisis could be considered such an EMU-wide shock
(though perhaps one on a scale only experienced every several decades), but figures such as
those suggested above would not be on a scale to cope with such a shock, unless combined
with substantial deficits at the national level. The second is, in effect, to permit each member
country to set its fiscal stance in what it judges to be its own best interests. There have always
been concerns of ‘spill-over’ effects, whereby one country’s deficit affects the credit ratings
and interest rates faced by others. These concerns have been very much overstated. In the
absence of a substantial EU-wide fiscal policy designed to achieve high levels of economic
activity, each country has to be free to pursue that objective (if it wishes to do so).
The proposition of ‘functional finance’ (starting from Lerner, 1943) is that the budget deficit
should be set with a view to ensure a high level of economic activity and not tied to any
notion of a balanced budget (whether in current budget or total budget terms, whether on an
annual basis or over the business cycle). There is the well-known accounting relationship of
(G – T) = (Q – X) + (S – I) (where G is government expenditure, T tax revenues, Q imports,
X exports plus net income from abroad, S private savings and I private investment). The scale
of the budget deficit (or indeed budget surplus) then depends on the size of the current
account deficit, private savings and investment at a high level of economic activity. It then
follows that the appropriate budget deficit depends on the conditions surrounding the current
account (propensities to import, exports) and the net savings position (savings minus
investment). For a country with a current account deficit and a tendency for savings to exceed
investment would require a large budget deficit, while in contrast for a country with a current
account surplus, and investment tending to exceed savings, a budget surplus would be
appropriate. This is the basis of the ‘one size fits all’ problem, which comes with the SGP.
The shortcomings of the present SGP is that it seeks to impose the same conditions on all
countries regardless of their broader economic circumstances and that it is a balanced budget
(over the cycle), which is imposed on all. The latter will inevitably lead to deflationary
tendencies in many countries without any compensating stimulatory tendencies in other
countries.
It should be noted in the context of SGP rules and fiscal rules in more general terms that they
are very difficult if not impossible to enforce. Yet they do exist, and as noted in the
Economist (14 May, 2011, p. 88) there are 80 countries in 2011, which have fiscal rules, with
only 7 in 1990. Experience clearly shows that enforcement is difficult, if not impossible - see
above for relevant SGP enforcement difficulties and failures. In any case, SGP rules never
prevented the debt crisis in the EMU. Fiscal rules also entail the serious distributional effects
for such rules normally reduce benefits, which hurt severely the low-income groups.
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The ‘great recession’ has raised a host of issues regarding the merits of fiscal policy and
worries in certain quarters of debt financed budget deficits. In the EU/EMU, it has raised
another issue, which is concerned with fiscal policy in the environment of a monetary union.
We have argued that monetary unions need an active fiscal policy, which is accompanied by
fiscal transfers. The reason is simple enough. Regions within the EU/EMU are hit by
asymmetric shocks, which can only be contained by inter-regional transfers, which substitute
potentially for capital and labour mobility. The EU/EMU lack such a system, which is
desperately needed. In its absence it is conceivable that some member countries may be
compelled to exit the euro area.
8. European Central Bank: Monetary and Financial Policies
There is a need to make some fundamental changes to the operation of the European Central
Bank. The ECB, and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), has been established as
an ‘independent’ central bank. ‘Independence’ is to be interpreted in a political sense: “When
exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the
Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, neither the European Central Bank, nor
a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take
instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a
Member State or from any other body. The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and
the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to
influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the
national central banks in the performance of their tasks” (Article 130 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community).
It is not ‘independent’ in an ideological sense, and the ECB has frequently advocated fiscal
and other policies, which are formally outside of its remit but which conform to the anti-
Keynesian approach of fiscal consolidation and advocacy of ‘flexible labour markets’. For
example, writing in December 2009, ECB (2009) argued that “As regards fiscal policies, the
Governing Council [of the ECB] re-emphasises how important it is for governments to
develop, communicate and implement ambitious fiscal consolidation strategies in a timely
manner. These strategies must be based on realistic output growth assumptions and focus on
structural expenditure reforms, not least with a view to coping with the budgetary burden
associated with an ageing population. … With regard to structural reforms, most estimates
indicate that the financial crisis has reduced the productive capacity of the euro area
economies, and will continue to do so for some time to come. In order to support sustainable
growth and employment, labour market flexibility and more effective incentives to work will
be needed. Furthermore, policies that enhance competition and innovation are also urgently
needed to speed up restructuring and investment and to create new business opportunities” (p.
7).11 The ‘independence’ of a Central Bank has been based on ideas that politicians are not to
be trusted with key elements of macro-economic policy particularly in that elected politicians
would favour expansionary policies with little regard to the inflationary implications. This
view in part has been based on the idea of the Phillips curve and its different shape in the
short and long run. There is a short-run trade-off between economic activity and inflation,
which is absent in the long run in view of a hypothesised vertical Phillips curve relationship
(see Arestis and Sawyer, 2004; Sawyer, 2010, for a critique of this position). However, the
financial crisis has emphasised, to say the least, the need for financial stability as a key
objective of macroeconomic policy and of monetary policy. We would argue that the
financial stability objective should be a prime objective and the operational independence of
11 Similar statements are made by the Governor of the ECB at the press conference after the monthly meetings
of the Governing Council of the ECB. See, for example, Trichet (2011b).
13
the European Central Bank brought to an end. The adoption of financial stability objective
would, of course, require the development of a range of policy instruments.12
The ‘independence’ of the ECB would appear to preclude co-operation and co-ordination
between the different bodies responsible for aspects of macroeconomic policies. Yet, in a
world of multiple objectives (including high levels of economic activity and employment,
financial stability, inflation etc.) there is a need for multiple instruments, which are operated
by different authorities, and where there should be some co-ordination. At present, it is more
like subordination with monetary policy taking pride of place and fiscal policy neutered by
the lack of EMU fiscal policy and the constraints of the SGP on national budget deficits.
Sub-national government can differ from national government with respect to its debt and
deficits in that the bonds of the sub-national government tier may not be accepted by the
Central Bank as an ‘acceptable’ financial asset and its debt cannot be monetised, and further
lacks any ability to ‘print money’. The national government cannot itself ‘print money’, but
through its relationship with the Central Bank its debt can be monetised, and in extremis,
could require the Central Bank to buy central government bonds in exchange for ‘base
money’. In effect, through its relationship with the Central Bank, a national government
would never need to default on its own debt, provided that the debt is denominated in the
domestic currency. The arrangements within the EMU leave a national member government
in the position of a sub-national tier in the sense that the ECB can decide whether national
debt is ‘acceptable’ for financial-asset purposes and on what terms. The position needs to be
changed such that all financial assets issued by EMU member governments are always
accepted by the ECB.
The key reforms required with regard to the ECB are: (i) a reformulation of the objectives of
the ECB to include high and sustainable levels of employment and economic growth and
financial stability; (ii) the ECB must be made accountable to the European Parliament, and its
statutes changed so that it can clearly be involved in the co-ordination of fiscal and monetary
policies, and indeed that ultimately it can take instructions from other European bodies such
as the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN)13; (iii) the ECB operates with
regard to national governments within EMU in the ways in which a national central bank
would operate with regard to a national government, and specifically be able to, in effect,
monetise the debts of national governments.
9. Inflation
The policies on inflation have been, as indicated above, at best, a limited success. We have
argued that even this has been more by good luck and probably due to globalisation rather
than through the efficacy of the policy instrument (Arestis and Sawyer, 2011). In our view,
inflation in the EMU (and elsewhere) is influenced only to a limited extent by domestic
policies (Angeriz and Arestis, 2007, 2008; Arestis and Sawyer, 2008). Although there has
been an EMU level inflation policy operated through the ECB, there are also inflation
policies at the national level. To a greater or lesser extent there are national policies on wage
and price determination. As seen above, whether for reasons of national policies and/or
12 We elaborate on the importance of financial stability in Arestis and Sawyer (2011).
13 The ECOFIN is a “configurations of the Council of the European Union … and is composed of the
Economics and Finance Ministers of the 27 European Union member states, as well as Budget Ministers when
budgetary issues are discussed”. The tasks of the ECOFIN are: “economic policy coordination, economic
surveillance, monitoring of Member States' budgetary policy and public finances, the euro (legal, practical and
international aspects), financial markets and capital movements and economic relations with third countries. It
also prepares and adopts every year, together with the European Parliament, the budget of the European Union
which is about €100 bn” (both quotes are from :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_and_Financial_Affairs_Council).
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differences in the price and wage setting institutions, differences in national inflation rates
have persisted.
Some of the proponents of the euro acknowledged that the conditions to be in place for a
successful single currency suggested by the OCA literature were not present (at least to the
degree needed) but that the continuing process of integration under a single currency would
generate changes in the direction of those conditions. One of the conditions of OCA is price
flexibility, understood to mean that the general level of prices in one country could change
relative to those in other countries within the currency union where there was a ‘shock’ to the
relative standing of that country. Essentially, changes in the demand or supply position would
be compensated by corresponding changes to relative prices. But it turned out that while there
was, in a sense, price flexibility between countries it was not in the manner envisaged. As can
be seen from Table 2, over the period 2002-2008 inflation in Germany did not increase as
rapidly as in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Yet Germany was running a current account surplus
and Greece, Portugal and Spain deficits. The differences in inflation also had perverse effects
in terms of inflation policy.
If the differences in inflation experience persist, then the euro will be further undermined.
There is clearly no EU level policy at present, which can address this issue. One approach
would be to assert that the pressures of integration would lead to countries having to achieve
similar inflation rates. Even if that is so, similar inflation rates may well be combined with
different levels of unemployment. Paradoxically this commonality of inflation rates could be
engineered by national fiscal policy. There is then a need for the development of some
understanding between EMU member countries on this issue.
10. Current Account Deficits and Competitiveness
The data in Tables 2 and 3 indicate something of the scale by which relative prices and
relative unit labour costs have changed, when the nominal exchange rates of the national
currencies of the original EMU member states were locked together. One interpretation of
those changes is that they represent the adjustment of real exchange rates between EMU
member countries in the face of a combination of inappropriately set nominal exchange rates
(back in 1998 for most) and ‘shocks’. But this overlooks the prevailing current account
deficits when the euro was formed and some tendency for the current account deficits to
persist and widen. A country in a fixed exchange rate system, which is in the nature of a
currency union for participating countries, in dealing with cumulative differential inflation
and current account deficits can endure domestic deflation (to reduce imports and perhaps
lower domestic costs) or can devalue its currency. The latter is ruled out by membership of
EMU. So it would appear that deflation is the only answer. Before dealing with this
proposition it is important to note that current account imbalances among the EMU member
countries were not considered in the process of setting up the euro area (see Arestis and Paúl,
2009, for further details). However, more recently and in view of the ‘great recession’ a new
mechanism for the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances has been
proposed (European Council, 2011). Economies with problematic imbalances would be
identified along with numerical monitoring. Subsequent inspections would be undertaken to
identify the seriousness of the problem and recommendations would be proposed. The latter
could include corrective measures to be reviewed by the Council subsequently. Economic
sanctions would be applied if necessary within the framework of the revised SGP or the new
‘pact for the euro’ (see section 11 below for further details on the revised SGP and the new
‘pact for the euro’).
A current account deficit can interact with a budget deficit in the following sense. As is well
known from the identity (X-Q) = (S-I) + (T-G), with the symbols as in section 7, a current
account deficit and a budget deficit will be related for a given net savings position. Other
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things being equal (that is net savings) then a larger current account deficit would be
associated with a larger budget deficit (there is no causal link implied). The current account
deficits on the scale observed in a number of EMU countries are not sustainable. Yet
countries are locked into a fixed nominal exchange rate system, where many have
experienced a loss of competitiveness and in effect rising real exchange rates. There have to
be mechanisms developed for the adjustments of those exchange rates, which would seem to
require a co-ordinated mechanism for the adjustment of the prevailing exchange rates
between member countries of the EMU and for the generation of similar rates of inflation. It
has also been argued above that the ECB should relate to member governments and to their
financial liabilities in a manner similar to the ways in which a national central bank would to
a national government. These policy initiatives involve many of the features of a political
integration. It is on the latter aspect to which we turn our attention next. Before doing so it is
worth noting that another way of regaining the possibility of achieving competitiveness is for
the weak countries to reintroduce their national currencies. Such a move would also enable
these countries to manage their public debts and avoid bankruptcy since they can under the
new circumstances print money and finance budget deficits in the process. However, the
latter solution entails the serious problem that the accounts of non-residents are bound to be
shifted to non-domestic bank accounts that would lead to an outflow of capital with dramatic
adverse implications for the domestic banking sectors. The rescue packages, described below
in section 11, are designed to avoid problems of the type to which we have just referred and
also bail out weak countries to prevent them from bankruptcies.14
The pattern of current account imbalances poses considerable difficulties for EMU. The
presence of trade deficits along with the statistics on the evolution of unit labour costs and
prices suggest that many, particularly Mediterranean, countries suffer from a lack of
competitiveness and in the context of a single currency area an inability to devalue. The
pattern of current account deficits and surpluses implies a corresponding pattern of capital
account surpluses (i.e. borrowing) and deficits (i.e. lending). Directly or indirectly capital is
flowing from the current account surplus countries to deficit countries, bearing in mind that
EMU has an entity close to balanced current account position. In the era prior to the financial
crisis, countries with current account deficits were able to borrow readily from others to fund
the deficit, and indeed within the EMU to do so at relatively low rates of interest. As noted
above, for those countries with relatively high inflation, real interest rates were particularly
low or even negative. The major difficulty with any current account deficit comes from the
requirement to continually fund the deficit, and the mounting debts and interest and similar
payments on the borrowing. The major challenge now facing EMU is how to correct the
pattern of surpluses and deficits, and to put in place policies which will prevent similar severe
imbalances reappearing in the future.
There may be doubts on the effectiveness of devaluation in terms of a nominal exchange rate
depreciation leading to a sustained real depreciation and the responsiveness of imports and
exports to the changes in prices involved with a devaluation. For a country with its own
currency devaluation would clearly be one response to current account deficit. In a single
currency area, a combination of slower or negative inflation in the deficit countries and faster
inflation in the surplus countries would help to resolve the current account imbalances. But in
14 It is interesting to note that “As of 31 December 2009, banks headquartered in the euro zone accounted for
almost two thirds (62%) of all internationally active banks’ exposures to the residents of the euro area countries
facing market pressures (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). French and German banks were particularly
exposed to the residents of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Together, they had $727 billion of exposures to
Spain, $402 billion to Ireland, $244 billion to Portugal and $206 billion to Greece. At the end of 2009, they had
$958 billion of combined exposures ($493 billion and $465 billion, respectively) to the residents of these
countries. This amounted to 61% of all reported euro area banks’ exposures to those economies” (BIS, 2010a,
pp. 18-19). It clearly is the case that France and Germany have a strong interest in rescuing the weak countries
to avoid possible bankruptcies and/or dramatic fall in the value of these countries’ sovereign debt.
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EMU this would involve a reversal of the patterns of inflation observed over the past decade
and would be a lengthy process to generate the scale of changes in relative competitiveness.
Further the process by which a deficit country sought to generate low or negative inflation
could well involve demand deflation with the consequent loss of employment and output.
This last point leads us to the major point that a failure to correct the current account
imbalances would condemn the deficit countries to many years of slow or negative growth,
with spillover effects on to the surplus countries. The survival of the EMU in its present form
and membership does depend on an ability to correct these imbalances. The alternative is for
some of the deficit countries to leave the euro and reintroduce their national currency which
would then most likely depreciate against the euro, bringing some relief to the deficit. EMU
core countries are, however, determined not to allow this procedure. In any case, there are
doubts as to how far devaluation (whether through depressing domestic prices within a single
currency or through reintroduction of own currency with subsequent depreciation against the
euro) could rectify the current account deficits. The productive base of the export industries
of the countries concerned may simply lack the capacity and/or markets to be able to expand
production and sales sufficiently in the face of devaluation to bring about the necessary
changes. The alternative would require a long-term plan to improve competitiveness and
build an industrial base. This, however, is a long-term solution and it is short-term solutions
that are solutions are desperately required. In other words, policies to enable the flow of
funds from surplus to deficit countries, during the period of reconstruction, are required. How
could that be developed is the focus of the section that follows.
11. Political Integration
A relevant question is the extent to which the recent changes at both the EMU and the EU
levels, especially so since the eruption of the ‘great recession’ in August 2007 and the
subsequent euro area debt crisis, move closer to a de facto political integration. To begin with
the absence of bailout mechanisms should be noted for it left the euro area completely
unarmed to deal with the debt crisis when it was erupted. A series of ad hoc measures have
been initiated and introduced as we discuss in what follows. It should also be noted that
regulation and supervision of the EMU financial system was grossly inadequate. We consider
all the aspects just touched upon in the rest of this section.
The European Commission called on 26th May 2010, and pledged on 8th June 2010, for new
taxes to be imposed on all the continent’s banks. The levies would form a set of national
funds, managed by national governments but under the aegis of a network of ‘bank resolution
funds’ that could be used to disburse emergency money in case of a financial crisis. It is
thereby the banks not the taxpayers that would bear the cost of such a crisis. This is a
different arrangement from the proposed ‘European Financial Stability Facility’ (EFSF),
formed on 1st July 2010 and endowed with a 250bn-euro fund, which was raised to a 440bn-
euros at a relevant meeting on 11th March 2011, and confirmed at another meeting of the
European Commission on 25th March 2011. This was initially intended to be a temporary
arrangement with an operational life of three years. However, on 17th December 2010
European leaders at a summit in Brussels agreed to make a treaty change so that EFSF
functions until 2013. It will then be replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to
help member indebted states when in acute cash flow difficulties; ESM will then become
permanent. It was also decided at the meeting of 11th March 2011, confirmed on 25th of
March 2011, that the new permanent bailout mechanism should be able to lend up to 500bn
euros through increased guarantees from triple-A states and paid-in capital from those states
with weaker balance sheets – in a subsequent meeting of the European finance ministers it
was agreed to 700bn euros capital, of which 80bn euros would actually be paid in; the rest
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would be ‘callable’ capital.15 This facility aims to reassure financial markets and help out
euro-area member states struggling to issue sovereign debt and faced with banking troubles.
In terms of the funding arrangements of both the EFSF and ESM, however, the relevant
decision has been postponed until June 2011. This was due essentially to the German
negotiators who bowed at the last minute to domestic political pressure and persistently
proposed a reduction of their contribution to the bailout mechanism. Under the deal reached
on 25th March 2011, euro area and other governments will have to pay their share of capital
over five years, instead of the four years initially agreed.16 The rate of interest on new loans
from this facility is expected to be lower by up to 1 percent than previously.
The key element is the creation of a permanent liquidity facility under the aegis of the ESM.
This would be available as a means of crisis resolution if there is a risk to the stability of the
euro area as a whole. The crucial difference between the EFSF and ESM is that the credits of
the latter would be more senior to those of private investors. This will reduce the risk to the
budget of the creditor nations, since it is expected that by 2013 European banks should be in a
better position to absorb losses. The ESM will not come into force before 2013. All the
changes of the ‘grand bargain’ are expected to be ratified by the parliaments of the EU’s
member states before the next meeting of the European Commission in June 2011 when the
whole package would be eventually confirmed.17 These new measures reduce the cost of
bailing-out countries in trouble but increase it for those who have been, or potentially could
be, in need for bailout. They do not address the issue of high sovereign debt, which had
appeared to have been the focus of the whole exercise. Still, the exercise has been turned into
a political game, one of what should have been an exercise to sort out the economic crisis. In
this sense, it would not be surprising if the European leg of the ‘great recession’ is not
contained any sooner.
It should be stressed that all these arrangements had not been envisaged by the creators of the
EMU. For it is case that one of the ‘pillars’ of the EMU and the euro was the ‘no bailout, no
exit and no default’ clause. The sovereign debt crisis simply changed significantly that
principle at least in terms of the ‘bailout’ part of the clause. Still the agreed funds mentioned
above should not be used to purchase government debt in the open market. They should be
used to buy the debt from struggling governments. But there is a condition attached. This is
that the struggling governments should agree to implement significant austerity measures.
Yet it all amounts to increase the level of debt in the countries concerned. This is justified on
the premise that the new mechanism helps the countries involved in that the loan conditions
are much better than the ones replaced. But the debt of the countries involved piles up
thereby creating another serious danger, the possibility of default. This, however, entails a
further danger in view of the high exposure of a number of European banks to weak countries
debt (see footnote 15). This may very well explain that despite the alleged seriousness of the
European debt crisis, default has not been seriously considered yet. Indeed, it might not
happen to the extent that support continues to be forthcoming. The weak country debt would
continue to grow so long as support is forthcoming until the debt is all accumulated in, and
held, by the official sector. Under these conditions the official sector will be the last holder of
the assets that take the full loss. The taxpayer will carry the burden yet again, not the original
bondholder. The ECB is trying very hard to avoid this problem. While helping the troubled
15 It should be noted that the 700bn-euro fund is not really substantial in that the ‘callable’ capital entails the real
danger of some countries not being able to honour their commitments.
16 The EFSF/ESM will comprise of all the seventeen EMU-member states, plus a number of EE, but not EMU,
members. The latter include Denmark, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Rumania, which have pledged to
join the EFSF/ESM arrangements.
17 In the meantime, the EFSF is in the process of issuing the ‘euro bond’, a sovereign responsibility of the EMU.
This is an important development in that it is the first time that a bond issue is undertaken by an institution on
behalf of the EMU as one entity. The first issue took place on the 25th January 2011 as part of its mission to
provide liquidity to countries whose financial markets face serious difficulties.
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countries, at the same time it attempts to sell debt to avoid excess liquidity in the market – the
ECB does not undertake ‘quantitative easing’. This is not always possible, though. It is not
infrequent to find that since May 2010 when this operation started that that the ECB failed in
its attempt to neutralise fully the effect on liquidity of purchasing government bonds.
Further relevant developments that will come into effect in 2013 include common fiscal and
economic policies. One dimension of these policies may very well be dubbed as ‘a reformed
Stability and Growth Pact’. This includes close monitoring on government spending, pension
schemes, and limits on wage increases in the public sector. There is also a further
commitment for country-members to close the gap between their current debt levels and the
EU’s debt limit of 60 per cent of GDP. This is of course in addition to the financial penalties
of countries that do not conform with the budget deficit of 3 per cent. The debt to GDP limit
should be achieved by member countries initiating a 5 per cent per year reduction until the 60
percent target is met. If a member country fails to close the gap between its debt level and the
60 per cent limit of GDP, by 5 percentage points per year, it will be subject to a fine of 0.2
per cent of its GDP. The fine would be automatic, unless a majority of the council opposed it.
The agreement does also allow pension reforms to be offset in national accounts and private
indebtedness taken into consideration before a country is fined. Furthermore, governments
must not spend more each year than their medium term economic growth rate. All these
measures, however, amount to deficit- and debt-tightening until the same rules as prior to the
‘great recession’ are achieved. But those rules failed since they lacked credible enforcement.
So that for the same reasons its predecessors failed in the past (see, for example, Arestis,
2010; also Arestis and Sawyer, 2006), the current proposals are bound to fail again. This is
actually the third attempt at a SGP. It clearly follows that what is needed is a plan for reform
not a pact that has shown to have been so unsuccessful in the past. Such a plan should be
based on effective economic governance, with firm roots on economic convergence. Co-
ordination of economic policies is vital. Consequently the current, similar with previous,
proposals are bound to fail again without such different and more secured foundations. An
important missing dimension of the ‘grand bargain’ in relation to the ‘great recession’ is the
lack of pan-European policies to let banks fail safely thereby forcing losses on creditors
rather than on taxpayers.
There is also the competitiveness pact, what has been labelled as the ‘pact for the euro’, or
‘euro-plus pact’. This is concerned with boosting the growth potential along with a common
corporate tax base in the region. It covers a number of areas: improving competitiveness,
through higher productivity and better alignment of wages and productivity; boosting
employment through flexibility and tax reforms; improving public finances; reinforcing
financial stability through legislation on banking and regular bank stress tests; and
introducing a financial transaction tax. The ‘pact for the euro’ is in principle a framework for
economic policy co-ordination in a number of macroeconomic policies. But it is far from it in
that no indication of such an objective is evident in the ‘pact for the euro’. It should be noted
that these arrangements are not merely for the EMU members. They would equally apply for
the non-EMU members of the EU, if they chose to participate in the ‘pact for the euro’.
On 23rd July 2010, the results of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
bank stress tests were published. These tests subjected banks in Europe to ‘unlikely but
plausible scenarios’, and were designed to ascertain whether banks had enough capital to
avoid default in crisis; also the setting of reasonable capital targets a better lending
environment would follow. Like the 2009 US similar bank stress tests, the European results
revealed a clean bill of health and a resilient banking system.18 However, in view of the
18 In the European case 91 banks, with 7 of them failing the stress test, were included in the sample. In the US
19 banks were included and 10 failed the stress test. Apparently the more stringent and earlier US stress test has
not helped in terms of its objective to boost bank lending, which continues to contract under tight conditions.
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results, interesting questions arise. The most important is perhaps the question of no
provision for the possibility of sovereign default. A further question is the extent to which the
safety margin of capital (‘core’ capital to asset ratio with a threshold of 6 per cent) that banks
were required to hold should have been higher. Consequently, was the threshold ratio
sufficiently stressful? Indeed, a number of banks perceived as weak, managed to pass the test
– including five of the six Greek banks tested. There is also the argument that the ‘core’
capital, defined as equity, retained earnings and various types of hybrid debt instruments
(which have the characteristics of equity but also of bonds) is not suitable. The relevant
argument is that if ‘core’ capital had been defined as equity and retained earnings, the real
risk-absorbing elements, a number of banks would not have passed the test. Still there is the
question of whether the institutions left out were unimportant enough. Indeed, there are
institutions whose financial health is not entirely clear and yet left out of the test. In any case,
these tests complement the establishment of the EFSF and the recent financial supervisory
framework within Europe. We may note in passing that CEBS is due to become the European
Banking Authority (EBA).19
These recent changes, which are by far stricter than previously, do not form in any way a step
forward towards a de facto political integration. One implication is that the agreement to
strengthen the euro area, the ‘reformed Stability and Growth Pact’ together with the ‘euro-
plus pact’, focussing on broader macroeconomic reforms imply that future economic
decisions will be taken collectively by the 17 euro-area states – not separately as in the past.
Still they rely on the supply-side of the EMU economy, neglecting the role and importance of
aggregate demand. They also need to be applied to all member countries in a consistent way.
For example, in the case of imbalances within the euro area countries both deficit and surplus
members should be involved in the rebalancing, not merely to deficit countries as it is in the
current versions. This type of policies failed in the past and they will fail again in the future.
There is nothing in the revised proposals to suggest that they will not fail. When it comes to
conflicts between national governments and the European Commission, the latter loses. This
reinforces our main point. For it is clear that all these developments lack the important
dimension of integration. It clearly follows that future steps to closer integration are
absolutely necessary. For otherwise there is a serious risk of gradual unravelling of what little
has been achieved. It is true of course that some integration is in place within the EU/EMU,
which is difficult to break. It is, nonetheless, too weak to function satisfactorily as we have
demonstrated in this contribution. Clearly further integration is vital.
An interesting proposal comes from the President of the ECB in a speech (Trichet, 2011a)
where he argues for an EU Finance Ministry. The suggestion is that “In this Union of
tomorrow, or of the day after tomorrow, would it be too bold, in the economic field, with a
single market, a single currency and a single central bank, to envisage a ministry of finance of
the Union? Not necessarily a ministry of finance that administers a large federal budget. But a
ministry of finance that would exert direct responsibilities in at least three domains: first, the
surveillance of both fiscal policies and competitiveness policies, as well as the direct
responsibilities mentioned earlier as regards countries in a ‘second stage’ inside the euro area;
second, all the typical responsibilities of the executive branches as regards the union’s
integrated financial sector, so as to accompany the full integration of financial services; and
third, the representation of the union confederation in international financial institutions” (p.
7). The president concludes by clarifying to suggest that “I think that [eventually] a
confederation of sovereign states of a new type, with new institutions to manage the
19 An important international development that affects the EU/EMU members and their banking sectors is the
Basel III standards (BIS, 2010b). The main purpose of Basel III is to enhance banks’ capital requirements to
make them safer and avoid the problems of the ‘great recession’. The EU intends to modify Basel III standards
in an attempt to allow banks to count for more in their total capital. This would relax Bael III regulations and
relax EMU’s grip on banks when the opposite should be forthcoming.
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interdependence of today and tomorrow, would be fully in line with such a heroism of
reason” (Trichet, op. cit., p. 8; see, also, Trichet, 2011b). This proposal may be seen as a step
towards a closer integration of national budgetary policies and enforcement of controls over
spending and borrowing within the EU. Such a suggestion, though, is by far short of
providing a true and closer integration that would provide policies to be able to tackle the
kind of problems the EU/EMU area has faced at the time of the ‘great recession’.
12. Concluding Comments
We would argue that the policy framework within which the euro is placed is ‘not fit for
purpose’. Three aspects of this argument stand out. First, the ‘independence’ of the ECB
precludes the ECB devoting its attention to financial stability and to co-ordinating and co-
operating with other macroeconomic institutions in pursuit of other objectives, such as high
levels of economic activity. Second, it does not have ways of developing fiscal policy, which
would be supportive of high levels of economic activity, recognising that budget deficits are
generally required. Third, there are no mechanisms for resolving the pattern of current
account deficits and surpluses, which we argue are unsustainable in their present form.
Without the ability to vary the exchange rate, countries with current account deficits will be
thrown back to deflation. For it is the case that the EMU completely lacks any mechanisms
by which countries can resolve their deficit problems.
A further problem, which has emerged and highlighted by the ‘great recession’ is the dual
economic reality in the EMU. This is the northern part of the EMU, where the economies are
reviving, with Germany and France at the forefront, especially Germany; and the periphery,
mostly southern (Greece and Portugal) but including Ireland, heavily involved in the
sovereign-debt crisis. Given the onerous austerity packages imposed on the latter countries,
the really interesting question is how long they will be able to withstand the pressures for
even more austerity and the undesirable consequences. Fallout is seriously and eminently
possible. At the same time, though, no serious attempt is initiated at seriously resolving the
dual economic reality. The choice faced by many EMU countries is then the stark one of
remaining with the euro and suffering an indefinite future of deflation and high
unemployment or in effect leaving the euro.
The economic problems within the euro area have been building since its inception, and have
become acute with the ‘great recession’. The faults lie in the neo-liberal design of the euro
project, now embedded in the Treaty of Lisbon, and where there is little prospect of serious
changes because of the unanimity requirements for change. But without basic and
fundamental changes, many (perhaps all) euro area countries face a bleak economic future.
Under these circumstances the future of the euro is surely not bright to say the least. This
contagious financial crisis is the biggest threat not merely to Europe but globally. Changes
within the euro area are thereby desperately needed. Most important of which is fiscal
integration. Indeed, the history of monetary unions around the world is very telling. In the
absence of economic integration, aq monetary union without a political integration simply
cannot survive (Arestis et al., 2003; Arestis and Sawyer, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). Whether the
latter or any other fundamental change is forthcoming, it is unfortunately a very sad
expectation. It should also be clear that cosmetic measures as currently proposed will not
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Austria -1.85 -0.5 -3.5 -4.4 63.1 75.9
Belgium -0.60 -1.4 -6.1 -4.9 88.0 102.5
Finland 3.40 4.2 -2.7 -3.3 45.5 58.4
France -3.15 -3.3 -7.6 -7.4 70.9 92.4
Germany -2.68 0.1 -3.0 -4.0 65.3 79.9
Greece -5.07 -7.8 -13.7 -8.3 108.5 129.2
Ireland 1.07 -7.3 -14.2 -32.3 29.4 104.9
Italy -3.22 -2.7 -5.2 -5.0 117.2 131.3
Luxembourg 1.08 3.0 -0.7 -2.2 7.6 21.0
Netherlands -1.12 0.5 -5.4 -5.8 61.1 74.6
Portugal -3.67 -3.0 -9.4 -7.3 68.8 92.9
Spain 0.63 -4.2 -11.1 -9.2 42.3 72.2
Euro Area
Average
(12) -1.27 -2.0 -6.2 -6.3 70.9 91.6
Source: Calculated from OECD, Economic Outlook Database (Various Issues)
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Austria 2.1 0.4 2.9
Belgium 2.3 0.0 2.1
Finland 1.8 1.6 1.4
France 2.2 0.1 1.6
Germany 1.9 0.2 1.0
Greece 3.7 1.3 4.7
Ireland 2.9 -1.7 -1.6
Italy 2.6 0.8 1.5
Luxembourg 3.1 0.0 2.6
Netherlands 2.2 1.0 0.8
Portugal 2.7 -0.9 1.4






Source: Calculated from OECD, Economic
Outlook Database (Various Issues)
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Change in Unit Labour
Costs (%)
2001-2008
Austria 2.53 3.3 2.7 2.6 3.50
Belgium 3.05 -1.9 0.8 1.0 11.96
Finland 5.50 2.9 2.7 1.5 4.33
France 0.13 -1.9 -1.9 -2.2 7.66
Germany 4.62 6.7 4.9 5.1 5.37
Greece -8.75 -14.7 -11.4 -10.5 17.02
Ireland -2.33 -5.6 -3.0 -0.3 34.55
Italy -1.63 -3.6 -3.2 -3.3 9.73
Luxembourg 10.42 5.3 6.7 7.8 9.48
Netherlands 6.52 4.3 4.6 5.3 11.41
Portugal -9.07 -12.6 -10.3 -10.3 7.44
Spain -6.42 -9.7 -5.5 -5.5 16.49
Euro Area Average
(12) 0.58 -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 11.58
Source: Calculated from OECD, Economic Outlook Database (Various Issues)
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Austria 2.3 2.48 0.03 3.6 4.3
Belgium 2.3 2.13 0.07 6.9 7.7
Finland 2.9 3.45 -1.47 9.6 8.4
France 2.1 1.87 -0.27 9.0 9.5
Germany 1.7 1.30 -0.17 7.5 7.1
Greece 2.3 4.13 -1.63 11.2 15.9
Ireland 7.7 5.40 -3.83 4.2 14.7
Italy 1.6 1.05 -1.80 10.1 8.3
Luxembourg 4.6 4.60 0.33 2.2 5.5
Netherlands 3.2 1.98 -0.10 3.0 5.0
Portugal 2.7 1.00 -0.33 4.0 12.4
Spain 2.8 3.38 -1.00 11.1 20.7
Euro Area
Average
(12) 3.0 1.88 -0.70 8.5
10.0
Source: Calculated from OECD, Economic Outlook Database (Various Issues)
